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SEC V. CREDITORS: 
WHY SEC CIVIL ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE 
DEMONSTRATES THE NEED FOR A 
REPRIORITIZATION OF SECURITIES 
FRAUD CLAIMS IN BANKRUPTCY 
SEAN KELLY† 
INTRODUCTION 
For over forty years there has been a growing tension 
between the Securities and Exchange Commission’s civil 
enforcement mission to protect defrauded securities holders and 
bankruptcy law’s treatment of those claimants.  Bankruptcy 
Code § 510(b) generates this tension by subordinating defrauded 
securities holders’ claims, giving them the same priority as 
shareholders generally and a lower priority than creditors—
leaving no practical opportunity to recover in bankruptcy.  In 
response, the SEC utilizes mechanisms in and out of bankruptcy 
like fair funds and equitable receiverships to elevate would-be 
subordinated securities fraud claims over those of creditors. 
This Note examines how this tension has motivated the SEC 
to use receiverships as a preferred vehicle to maximize recovery 
for defrauded security holders and, in the process, create what 
amounts to an SEC-run bankruptcy proceeding.  The use of these 
receiverships has triggered a high-stakes race to the courthouse 
among the SEC and creditors, where mere hours can be the 
difference between millions in recovery and nothing at all.  To 
end this costly race, this Note proposes a solution that seeks to 
harmonize securities fraud enforcement with bankruptcy law, 
which starts with revisiting Bankruptcy Code § 510(b) to 
reprioritize securities fraud claims in bankruptcy. 
Part I explains how securities fraud claims are treated in 
bankruptcy under § 510(b), illustrating when such claims are 
subordinated and the rationale for doing so.  Part II provides an 
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J.D., 2019, St. John’s University School of Law; B.A., 2014, Florida State University. 
The Author extends his special thanks to Professor Keith Sharfman for his 
invaluable insight and guidance in writing this Note, and to his family for their 
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overview of the SEC’s influence in the bankruptcy context from 
the Agency’s restricted role in the Code to its empowerment by 
Sarbanes-Oxley.  Next, Part III.A explains how Sarbanes-Oxley 
empowers the SEC to use fair funds to compensate defrauded 
security holders in bankruptcy.  Similarly, Part III.B explains 
how the SEC acts alternatively, out of bankruptcy, through 
equitable receiverships to recover for securities fraud victims. 
Part IV demonstrates how § 510(b) has motivated the SEC to 
avoid bankruptcy altogether, and instead utilize equitable 
receiverships as a primary civil enforcement tool to compensate 
securities fraud victims of insolvent and near-insolvent entities.  
Part IV further illustrates the SEC’s influence over this process, 
culminating in receiver distributions that disadvantage creditors.  
Accordingly, this use of receiverships has started a race to the 
courthouse between the SEC and creditors. 
Finally, Part V proposes a solution to harmonize SEC civil 
enforcement policies with the Code.  This Part offers objectives 
for Congress to better integrate securities fraud claims back into 
the bankruptcy process.  In addition, it suggests practical means 
to achieve integration like elevating the United States Trustee to 
allow for more coordination with the SEC and the creation of a 
receivership-focused SEC position to benefit all securities fraud 
victims of insolvent entities—security holders and creditors alike. 
I. THE TREATMENT OF SECURITIES FRAUD CLAIMS IN 
BANKRUPTCY: § 510(B) AND THE CODE 
When an entity collapses, two types of bankruptcy are 
available to the insolvent entity: liquidation or reorganization.  
Liquidation permits individuals or entities to liquidate their 
assets and distribute the proceeds to creditors under Chapter 7 of 
the Code.1  Reorganization allows high-income individuals and 
business entities to reorganize their debts and continue 
operations upon filing under Chapter 11.2  In Chapter 7 and 
Chapter 11 cases, the Bankruptcy Code provides a fundamental 
ordering of payment distributions between equity owners and 
creditors that prioritizes creditor claims, ensuring those claims 
will be paid in full before equity owners receive any distribution.3  
 
1 11 U.S.C. §§ 701–784 (2012). 
2 Id. §§ 1101–1174. 
3 Chapter 7 priority is set under § 726(a). Id. § 726. Chapter 11 reorganization is 
set under § 1129(a). Id. § 1129. This ordering in a reorganization, collectively set by 
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Thus, “at its core, bankruptcy solves a collective action problem 
among [self-interested] creditors” that eliminates strategic costs 
associated with a race to the courthouse.4 
A. Section 510(b): Mandatory Subordination 
Section 510 is an integral part of Bankruptcy Code §§ 501 
through 511, which establish an allocation of estate assets among 
claimants in liquidation or reorganization cases.5  Within that 
section, Congress asked the difficult policy question concerning 
the status of a defrauded security-holding claimant who has 
sought to rescind a purchase of a security or to sue for damages 
based on the purchase: “Should he be treated as a general 
unsecured creditor based on his tort claim . . . or should his claim 
be subordinated?”6  The answer was mandatory subordination, 
embodied in § 510(b), of three types of claims: (1) claims arising 
from rescission of a purchase or sale of a security issued by the 
debtor or its affiliate; (2) claims for damages arising from the 
purchase or sale of such a security; and (3) claims for 
reimbursement or contribution on account of these claims.7 
 
 
 
§§ 1129 and 510(b) of the Code, is called the absolute priority rule. Id. § 1129; 
id. § 510(b). 
4 Douglas G. Baird, Priority Matters: Absolute Priority, Relative Priority, and the 
Costs of Bankruptcy, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 785, 789 n.11 (2017). The collective action 
problem occurs when investors of a firm with value as a going concern lands in 
financial distress and causes “each individual investor [to] find it in her [own] self-
interest to try to recover what she is owed without paying attention to the 
consequences for everyone else.” Id. at 789. Such efforts tear the firm apart because 
“investors are too dispersed to reach an agreement that would put a stop to a 
destructive race to the assets[.]” Id. 
5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 510.01 (16th ed. 2009) [hereinafter COLLIER]. 
6 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 194 (1977). 
7 11 U.S.C. § 510(b). 
For the purpose of distribution under this title, a claim arising from 
rescission of a purchase or sale of a security of the debtor or of an affiliate 
of the debtor, for damages arising from the purchase or sale of such a 
security, or for reimbursement or contribution allowed under § 502 on 
account of such a claim, shall be subordinated to all claims or interests that 
are senior to or equal the claim or interest represented by such security, 
except that if such security is common stock, such claim has the same 
priority as common stock. 
Id. For the seminal article criticizing Congress’ decision to favor subordination and 
create § 510(b), see Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., The Status of Defrauded Securityholders 
in Corporate Bankruptcy, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1 (1983). 
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Section 510(b) mandates that security-holding claimants will 
be unable to elevate their interests from the level of equity to 
general claims.8  Instead, such claims are subordinated to all 
claims senior or equal to the claim represented by the security.9  
And if the defrauded security claim is common stock, the claim 
assumes the same priority as common stock.10  “Put simply, 
‘creditors stand ahead of the investors on the receiving line.’ ”11 
B. Section 510(b): Theory of Risk Allocation 
“Any discussion of section 510(b) must begin with the 1973 
law review article authored by Professors John J. Slain and 
Homer Kripke . . . .”12  Congress generally adopted Slain and 
Kripke’s theory of risk allocation as the foundation for § 510(b).13  
The professors argued that “allowing a person to assert a claim in 
bankruptcy as an unsecured creditor based on the purchase of an 
equity interest impermissibly permitted the buyer of a risky 
security to bootstrap himself into a less risky class.”14 
Slain and Kripke presented a problem rooted in two risks: 
insolvency and illegality.15  Both creditor and security holder 
share the first risk of insolvency, but, the professors argued, only 
 
8 COLLIER, supra note 5, ¶ 510.04[1]. 
9 Id. Mandatory subordination affects all claims arising from transactions 
involving “securities.” The Bankruptcy Code provides fifteen examples of securities 
in § 101(49)(A). 11 U.S.C. § 101(49)(A). 
10 COLLIER, supra note 5, ¶ 510.04[1]. 
11 In re Geneva Steel Co., 281 F.3d 1173, 1179 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting In re 
Granite Partners, L.P., 208 B.R. 332, 344 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997)). 
12 In re Granite Partners, L.P., 208 B.R. at 336 (citing John J. Slain & Homer 
Kripke, The Interface Between Securities Regulation and Bankruptcy—Allocating the 
Risk of Illegal Securities Issuance Between Securityholders and the Issuer's 
Creditors, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 261 (1973)). 
13 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 194, 196 (1977). 
14 THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 63 (1986). 
See, e.g., In re Geneva Steel Co., 281 F.3d at 1179 (“[I]t is clear that Congress 
embraced Professors Slain and Kripke’s theory of risk allocation, namely, that 
general creditors assume a different type of risk with respect to the debtor’s 
insolvency than do investors. And not only are general creditors unable to share in 
the potential benefits flowing from company success, they rely on the equity cushion 
created by the investors’ capital contributions for payment. While Slain and Kripke 
focused primarily on shareholder rescission claims, their larger concerns sprang 
from what they termed the ‘disaffected stockholder’s efforts to recapture his 
investment from the corporation.’ ” (citations omitted)); In re Telegroup, Inc., 281 
F.3d 133, 142 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Congress enacted § 510(b) to prevent disappointed 
shareholders from recovering their investment loss by using fraud and other 
securities claims to bootstrap their way to parity with general unsecured creditors in 
a bankruptcy proceeding.”). 
15 Slain & Kripke, supra note 12, at 286. 
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security holders—who join in the opportunity to enjoy profits of 
the entity—assume the risk of illegality in securities issuance.16  
Thus, permitting securities fraud claimants to share priority 
with general creditors wrongly allocates the risk of illegality to 
creditors.  In addition, mandatory subordination of the claims of 
security holders is supported by creditor reliance on an equity 
cushion17 and, since the establishment of the Code, creditor 
reliance on subordination to maintain priority over security 
holders if bankruptcy occurs.18 
By accepting Slain and Kripke’s proposal for mandatory 
subordination in § 510(b), Congress, in turn, rejected opposing 
arguments—the most vocal of which was from the SEC.19  The 
Commission posited that defrauded security holders never 
bargained for the securities they received and, consequently, 
never actually took on that risk of insolvency.20  Instead, the SEC 
argued that “general maxims of bankruptcy give a debtor’s 
unsecured creditors equal footing in recovery, whether their 
claims sound in tort, breach of contract, or some other cause of 
action,” and so posed the question:  “[W]hy should shareholder 
fraud victims receive different treatment from that accorded 
other tort claimants, such as a pedestrian hit by the bankrupt’s 
delivery truck?”21  The SEC unsuccessfully argued that defrauded 
security holders should be treated like any other tort victim of 
the debtor—as a general unsecured tort creditor.22 
 
16 COLLIER, supra note 5, ¶ 510.04[2]. 
17 Id. For a critique of this equity cushion analysis, see Davis, Jr., supra note 7, 
at 20; Douglas A. Henry, Comment, Subordinating Subordination: WorldCom and 
the Effect of Sarbanes-Oxley’s Fair Funds Provision on Distributions in Bankruptcy, 
21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 259, 282–83 (2004). 
18 COLLIER, supra note 5, ¶ 510.04[2] (citing Jezarian v. Raichle (In re Stirling 
Homex Corp.), 579 F.2d 206, 213 (2d Cir. 1978) (“When a corporation becomes 
bankrupt, the temptation to lay aside the garb of a stockholder, on one pretense or 
another, and to assume the role of a creditor, is very strong, and all attempts of that 
kind should be viewed with suspicion.”) (internal quotation and citation omitted)). 
19 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 195–96 (1977). Ironically, it was the SEC that 
argued for principles of absolute priority in the early part of the twentieth century. 
See generally Douglas G. Baird, Present at the Creation: The SEC and the Origins of 
the Absolute Priority Rule, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 591 (2010). 
20 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 195 (1977). 
21 Davis, Jr., supra note 7, at 2 (citing U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON 
S.235 AND S.236, reprinted in The Bankruptcy Reform Act: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Mach. of the Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 738–79 (1975)). 
22 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 196 (1977). The SEC argued that “[m]andatory 
subordination would result in different treatment to security holders whose fraud 
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The priority rule embodied in § 510(b) is clear: subordination 
is mandatory, regardless of the equities, and any security 
holder’s claim under this section will be subordinated until the 
claims of general unsecured creditors have been satisfied.23  The 
Code’s rigid prioritization rule “makes it unlikely that securities 
fraud plaintiffs will receive any distribution” in bankruptcy, with 
the practical effect of deterring securities fraud plaintiffs from 
pursuing claims against insolvent companies.24  Section 510(b) 
protects creditors, and “its language, its legislative history, and 
most important, its embodied legislative policy choices, reflect 
strong congressional disapproval of investor fraud claims in 
bankruptcy.”25 
II. THE SEC AND THE CODE 
When Congress overhauled the bankruptcy laws in 1978, it 
rejected the SEC’s position that the Agency’s oversight was 
essential to protecting investors in bankruptcy, almost entirely 
excluding it from the process.26  But the Agency’s demotion would 
not be permanent.27  The SEC’s ability to protect public investors 
in and out of bankruptcy would be revived in part by Congress’  
 
 
 
 
 
claims were reduced to judgment before bankruptcy, and those security holders 
whose claim had not reached that point.” Id. 
23 COLLIER, supra note 5, ¶¶ 510.04[1], [7]. 
24 John M. Wunderlich, Bankruptcy’s Protection for Non-Debtors from Securities 
Fraud Litigation, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 375, 390–91 (2011) (citing In re 
ComDisco, Inc., 271 B.R. 273, 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2002) (“[U]nder § 510(b) the 
securities fraud claims are likely to be subordinated to creditor claims, and dealt 
with on the same priority as the shareholder interests . . . . The effect of that 
subordination is not possible to predict with certainty. But one very real possibility 
is that the plaintiff class claims will be discharged by the plan without any payment. 
That will happen if the confirmed plan makes no distribution at the equity level. In 
other words, if the reorganization value of the Debtor is insufficient to pay all of the 
$4 billion in claims (and if the creditors do not agree to a distribution at the equity 
level), then by operation of law the plaintiff’s claims against the Debtor will be 
discharged without any possibility of a recovery.”)). 
25 In re Geneva Steel Co., 281 F.3d 1173, 1179 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing In re 
Granite Partners, L.P., 208 B.R. 332, 344 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997)). 
26 David A. Skeel, Jr., The Rise and Fall of the SEC in Bankruptcy 13 (Univ. of 
Pa. L. Sch. Inst. for L. and Econ., Working Paper No. 267, 1999), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=172030 [hereinafter Rise and Fall]. 
27 David A. Skeel, Jr., Welcome Back, SEC?, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 573, 
573–74 (2010). 
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response to the massive accounting fraud scandals that rocked 
the country in the early 2000s, and with that came the sustained 
restoration of the SEC as an influential party in bankruptcy.28 
A. A Loss of Influence: The Bankruptcy Code 
Congress empowers the SEC to protect investors and to 
oversee the integrity of the market.29  In the bankruptcy context, 
the SEC played a vital role under the Bankruptcy Act, the 
Bankruptcy Code’s predecessor.30  But its function under the 
Code’s Chapter 11 reorganization was clearly circumscribed so 
that, in practice, the SEC would not play a significant role in the 
vast majority of cases.31  Instead, “Congress adopted the view 
that . . . equity security holders are very often better judges of the 
debtor’s economic viability and their own economic self-interest 
than courts, trustees, or [governmental agencies such as] the 
SEC.”32 
Congress did expressly recognize the role of the SEC in 
bankruptcy by including it in the “Right to be Heard” section of 
the Code.33  That said, the legislative history of § 1109 confirms 
that Congress intended a substantially modified role for the 
Commission.34  Congress explained that the SEC’s tapered role 
would enable the Bankruptcy Court to better evaluate all sides of 
a position to determine the public interest, unlike under the 
Bankruptcy Act, where SEC influence made that determination 
 
28 Id. at 578; Alistaire Bambach & Samuel R. Maizel, The SEC’s Role in Public 
Company Bankruptcy Cases Where There Is a Significant Enforcement Interest, 2005 
ANN. SURV. OF BANKR. L. 3 (2006). Alistaire Bambach is the Assistant Regional 
Director and Chief Bankruptcy Counsel to the Division of Enforcement of the SEC. 
Her expressed views do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission, but as 
the SEC’s top bankruptcy lawyer since 2001, her views are highly influential in the 
Commission’s enforcement strategy in bankruptcy. 
29 The SEC’s stated mission is “to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and 
efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.” What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html. 
30 COLLIER, supra note 5, ¶ 1109.03[4]. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. ¶ 1109.LH[1][d] (quoting Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. 
LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 458 n.28 (1999)). 
33 Id. ¶ 1109.LH[1][d]. The legislative history makes clear that the SEC is not a 
party in interest under § 1109(b), meaning the Commission may not file a 
reorganization plan. Id. Under the Code, § 1109(a) provides that the SEC “may raise 
and may appear and be heard on any issue” in a Chapter 11 case, but “may not 
appeal from any judgment, order, or decree entered in the case.” 11 U.S.C. 1109(a) 
(2012). 
34 COLLIER, supra note 5, ¶ 1109.LH[1][d]. 
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“only in terms of the interest of public security holders.”35  To 
complete the Agency’s diminished role in bankruptcy, Congress 
created the United States Trustee, an arm of the Department of 
Justice, to act as the watchdog of bankruptcy and subsume much 
of the SEC’s function prior to the Code.36 
B. A Provision of Power: Sarbanes-Oxley 
The SEC’s bankruptcy revival began with the massive 
accounting fraud cases that ended in bankruptcy, like WorldCom 
and Enron.37  These “mega-cases” precipitated Congress’ passage 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 and, by extension, led to the 
SEC’s resurgence as an important participant in bankruptcy 
proceedings.38  In brief, Sarbanes-Oxley resulted in a broad grant 
of power that allowed the SEC to “ratchet[] up” financial 
penalties to reinject faith in the markets and “enhance 
deterrence and accountability.”39 
The SEC recognized Sarbanes-Oxley as an innovative 
legislative response to the financial and legal obstacles that 
hampered its ability to compensate defrauded security holders.40  
Three provisions of the Act helped clear those obstacles.  First, 
§ 305(b) authorized federal courts in actions brought by the SEC 
to grant any equitable relief that may be appropriate to benefit 
 
35 Id. (The modified “advisory role of the SEC will enable the court to balance 
the needs relating to the economy.”). 
36 28 U.S.C. § 586 (2012); H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 109 (1977) (The U.S. Trustee 
will “operate much as the Securities and Exchange Commission operates under 
current Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, protecting the public interest and 
ensuring that bankruptcy cases are conducted according to the law.”). 
37 Bambach & Maizel, supra note 28. 
38 Skeel, Jr., supra note 27, at 578. 
39 NICOLE A. BAKER ET AL., SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT MANUAL: TACTICS AND 
STRATEGIES 197 (2007) [hereinafter ENFORCEMENT MANUAL] (citing Stephen M. 
Cutler, Dir., Div. of Enf’t, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech at the 24th Annual Ray 
Garrett Jr. Corporate & Securities Law Institute (Apr. 29, 2004)). 
40 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 308(C) OF THE 
SARBANES OXLEY ACT OF 2002 1 (2003) [hereinafter SECTION 308(C) REPORT].  
As required by Section 308(c) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the staff of the 
Commission has conducted a review and analysis of its enforcement actions 
over the five years preceding the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to 
identify how such proceedings may best be utilized to provide restitution 
for injured investors. This report summarizes the findings and conclusions 
of that review. 
Id. 
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investors.41  Next, in providing the link between securities fraud 
actions and bankruptcy, “[s]ection 803 . . . amended 
the . . . Bankruptcy Code to make debts incurred for federal 
securities law violations”—including penalties and 
disgorgement—“non-dischargeable in bankruptcy.”42  Finally, the 
Federal Account for Investor Restitution (“FAIR”) Fund 
provision43 in § 308(a) authorized the SEC to take civil penalties 
collected in enforcement actions—previously required to be paid 
to the United States Treasury—and add them to disgorgement 
funds to benefit victims of securities law violations.44  
Collectively, Sarbanes-Oxley and these specific provisions 
significantly improved the capabilities and altered the strategy of 
SEC civil enforcement authority.45 
III.A.  SEC CIVIL ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY TO COMPENSATE 
SECURITIES FRAUD CLAIMANTS IN BANKRUPTCY: FAIR FUNDS 
Section 308(a) of Sarbanes-Oxley, the Fair Fund Provision, 
was a direct response to the large discrepancy created by 
corporate fraud cases between the amount in dollars lost and the 
amount that regulators could ever hope to collect in disgorgement 
alone.46  The SEC saw the Fair Fund provision as a powerful 
 
41 ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 39, at 184–85. This provision would 
provide the statutory underpinning for the broad authority provided to SEC 
receivers. See infra Part III.B. 
42 ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 39, at 207. The bankruptcy provision in 
§ 803 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act prohibits individuals from obtaining discharge of 
the Commission’s disgorgement claims; previously, only penalties were 
automatically nondischargeable. Id. The new provision enables the Commission to 
preserve its claims for both disgorgement and penalties, and thereby increases 
potential assets for collection. Id. 
43 Urska Velikonja, Public Compensation for Private Harm: Evidence from the 
SEC’s Fair Fund Distributions, 67 STAN. L. REV. 331, 333 n.4 (2015) (citing Pub. L. 
No. 107-204, §308, 116 Stat. 745, 784-85 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7246 
(2012))). 
44 SECTION 308(C) REPORT, supra note 40, at 29–30; ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, 
supra note 39, at 197. Disgorgement is an equitable remedy that accounts for any 
“ill-gotten gain[s]” stemming from the fraud. Id. at 203. 
45 Zack Christensen, The Fair Funds for Investors Provision of Sarbanes-Oxley: 
Is It Unfair to the Creditors of a Bankrupt Debtor?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 339, 340–41 
(2005). Sarbanes-Oxley has been labeled “the most sweeping federal law concerning 
corporate governance since the adoption of the initial federal securities laws in 1933 
and 1934.” Id. at 375 n.11 (quoting Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory 
Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. 
CORP. L. 1, 3 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted)); SECTION 308(C) REPORT, 
supra note 40, at 1. 
46 ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 39, at 207–08. 
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vehicle to supplement its enforcement initiatives and 
significantly increase compensation for defrauded security 
holders.47  But to creditors, § 308(a) worked a “sea change” in the 
SEC’s powers and responsibilities, changing its focus from 
deterrence of securities fraud to after-the-fact compensation for 
defrauded security holders.48 
The Fair Fund provision enabled the SEC to increase 
collections in enforcement actions by combining penalty and 
disgorgement amounts into a fair fund used to compensate 
injured investors at the discretion of the Commission.49  
Accordingly, the SEC—a government agency treated as an 
unsecured creditor in the Code’s priority—used § 308(a) to 
compensate securities fraud claimants in bankruptcy who were 
otherwise subordinated pursuant to § 510(b).  This end run on 
§ 510(b) created a tension between the Bankruptcy Code and 
Sarbanes-Oxley that came to a head in the highly publicized 
WorldCom bankruptcy case.50 
 
 
47 SECTION 308(C) REPORT, supra note 40, at 22 (“Making appropriate 
distributions to investors, by applying the Fair Fund provision, is a desirable and 
important objective. The Commission intends to use the provision whenever 
reasonably possible, consistent with its mission to protect investors.”). One past SEC 
enforcement director described the Fair Fund provision as “ ‘[o]ne of the most 
frequently used tools’ created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.” Velikonja, supra note 43, 
at 334 n.14 (quoting Linda Chatman Thomsen & Donna Norman, Sarbanes-Oxley 
Turns Six: An Enforcement Perspective, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 393, 411 (2008)). 
48 Barbara Black, Should the SEC Be a Collection Agency for Defrauded 
Investors?, 63 BUS. L. 317, 342 (2008) (citing Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors 
of WorldCom, Inc. v. SEC, 467 F.3d 73, 83 (2d Cir. 2006) [hereinafter WorldCom]) 
(The Second Circuit rejected the “sea change” argument, instead viewing the Fair 
Fund provision as a tool that increased available funds for the SEC to distribute at 
its discretion). 
49 SECTION 308(C) REPORT, supra note 40, at 22. “Because section 308(a) only 
permit[ted] penalty amounts to be distributed to investors if there [was] also a 
disgorgement . . . the [SEC] adopted the practice of ordering $1 in disgorgement in 
[accounting fraud] cases where there [was] no identifiable unjust enrichment but the 
Commission want[ed] to distribute a penalty to investors.” ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, 
supra note 39, at 208 n.134. This practice, used in WorldCom, has not continued in a 
significant way since then. Velikonja, supra note 43, at 392–93. 
50 The WorldCom court itself recognized the tension between the Fair Fund 
provision and § 510(b). 467 F.3d at 85 (“We recognize . . . that there is tension 
between the priority assigned to claims under the Bankruptcy Code and the Fair 
Fund provision[.]”). Indeed, the Enron court even noted “that some have argued that 
Congress effectively created an exception to the absolute priority rule and the 
priority regime under the Bankruptcy Code when it enacted [Sarbanes-Oxley].” In re 
Enron Corp., 341 B.R. 141, 169–70 n.25 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
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Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of WorldCom, Inc. 
v. SEC presents the definitive clash between the Fair Fund 
provision and § 510(b).51  In brief, WorldCom entered into 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy after revealing fraud on a multibillion-
dollar scale.52  As a result, the SEC brought a civil action as an 
unsecured creditor for $2.25 billion that, under the terms of the 
reorganization plan, would be satisfied by the bankruptcy estate 
for $500 million in cash and $250 million in the company’s new 
common stock.53  Thus, the Fair Fund provision permitted the 
SEC to recover and distribute $750 million—which would 
normally go to creditors—to defrauded security holders otherwise 
automatically subordinated under § 510(b).54 
WorldCom garnered much “scholarly and popular 
criticism.”55  However, Professor Urska Velikonja, in a first-ever 
empirical review of the SEC’s use of fair funds, determined that 
“WorldCom is the exception, not the rule, for fair fund 
distributions” in accounting fraud cases.56  The study revealed 
that the SEC instead used fair funds more often to compensate 
victims from individual and third-party defendants separate from 
the bankruptcy estate.57  Accordingly, the WorldCom bankruptcy  
 
 
51 The WorldCom discussion that follows should be taken as a cursory overview 
only, meant to provide a background for what led the Commission to adopt a 
strategy that avoids bankruptcy altogether. For a full analysis of the interaction and 
competition between competing principles and purposes of the Fair Fund provision 
and § 510(b) through an in-depth analysis of the WorldCom case, see Christensen, 
supra note 45 (concluding that Congress should amend the Fair Fund provision to 
prevent it from making an end run on § 510(b) and Bankruptcy Code priority). Cf. 
Henry, supra note 17, at 262 (concluding that the Fair Funds provision’s effect on 
the distribution of funds in bankruptcy is the “appropriate response to our evolving 
financial markets”). 
52 Christensen, supra note 45, at 355. 
53 Id. at 356. 
54 Id. 
55 Velikonja, supra note 43, at 367 (citing Black, supra note 48, at 332–33; Mark 
J. Roe & Frederick Tung, Breaking Bankruptcy Priority: How Rent-Seeking Upends 
the Creditors’ Bargain, 99 VA. L. REV. 1235, 1285–86 (2013) (explaining that fair 
fund distributions “directly contradict[]” bankruptcy priority)); Skeel, Jr., supra note 
27, at 584 (“The bankruptcy laws ordinarily subordinate a shareholder’s securities 
claims, but the SEC has evaded this rule and ignored the priority framework[.]”); 
Christensen, supra note 45, at 375 (arguing that Congress should amend the Fair 
Fund provision to prevent it from “alter[ing] the well-established distributional 
priorities of the Bankruptcy Code”). 
56 Velikonja, supra note 43, at 367. “There is no empirical support for the 
allegation that the SEC’s fair fund distributions systematically overcompensate 
defrauded shareholders.” Id. at 368. 
57 Id.  
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estate’s payment to the SEC does not represent a widespread 
enforcement practice in handling similar accounting fraud 
cases.58 
Still, for the SEC, WorldCom represents “the one published 
decision on point [that] makes clear that the SEC’s goal of 
returning money to defrauded investors trumps those concerns 
about bankruptcy priorities.”59  The Commission’s transcendental 
view of its noble mission to protect defrauded security holders 
through compensation, and its corresponding indifference toward 
the Bankruptcy Code, continues to pervade the Agency’s civil 
enforcement strategy.  That view came to a high-water mark in 
SEC v. Spongetech Delivery Systems, Inc.,60 where the SEC 
argued that the court should find its disgorgement claim had 
priority over a secured creditor’s claim in a Chapter 11 
bankruptcy proceeding—an argument in direct contravention of 
the Code.61 
III.B.  SEC CIVIL ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY TO COMPENSATE 
SECURITIES FRAUD CLAIMANTS OUT OF BANKRUPTCY: THE 
EQUITABLE RECEIVERSHIP 
An additional response to the massive accounting frauds 
that led to Sarbanes-Oxley was the SEC’s implementation of a 
“ ‘real-time’ enforcement initiative.”62  To carry out this initiative, 
the SEC more frequently sought: (1) temporary restraining 
orders and asset freezes to identify and stop fraudulent activity, 
and (2) the appointment of receivers to effectively compensate 
security holders.63  Section 308(c) of Sarbanes-Oxley required the 
SEC to analyze its enforcement actions involving civil penalties 
or disgorgement in order to identify the most efficient methods to 
provide restitution to injured investors.64  The report found that 
its real-time enforcement initiative and, notably, the 
appointment of a receiver, “enhance[d] the Commission’s ability 
to maximize investor recovery.”65  And because implementing a 
distribution plan for amounts deposited into a fair fund in large 
 
58 Id. 
59 Bambach & Maizel, supra note 28. 
60 98 F. Supp. 3d 530, 530 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). 
61 Id. at 535. 
62 SECTION 308(C) REPORT, supra note 40, at 22. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 1. 
65 Id. 
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and complex cases was proving cumbersome,66 equitable 
receiverships developed as an alternative to bankruptcy to allow 
the SEC to more effectively compensate defrauded security 
holders.67 
A receivership’s authority stems from the inherent equitable 
powers of federal courts to craft remedies that supplement 
Congress’ grant of statutory authority to the SEC.68  Here, 
§ 305(b) of Sarbanes-Oxley provided the statutory underpinning 
that supplements the use of receiverships in securities fraud 
actions.69  It allows the SEC to frequently seek receivers in 
situations of insolvency or near insolvency to wind down 
distressed, fraudulent entities and to compensate defrauded 
security holders.70 
The appointed receiver, the person who runs an equitable 
receivership, is an agent of the court, intended to act 
independently of the SEC in carrying out its prescribed duties.71  
Accordingly, the receiver must seek the court’s approval for 
specific actions.72  And because the SEC requests receivers under 
the court’s equitable authority, SEC receiverships are, by 
definition, equitable receiverships, meaning that the receiver’s 
powers and duties are set by a district court’s appointment order. 
A typical receiver appointment order includes standard 
powers and duties needed to execute the receivership.  The 
following is an example from an appointment order for Platinum 
 
66 ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 39, at 208. 
67 Alistaire Bambach, The SEC in Bankruptcy: Past and Present, 18 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 607, 611 (2010) [hereinafter Past and Present]. Judge Posner noted in 
Scholes v. Lehmann that “[c]orporate bankruptcy proceedings are not famous for 
expedition . . . and whatever advantages they may have over receiverships in a case 
such as this—if any, and none has been pointed out to us—are not ones that the 
defendants in these fraudulent conveyance actions should be heard to trumpet.” 56 
F.3d 750, 755 (7th Cir. 1995). 
68 Keith Miller, Regulatory Litigation with the SEC, 7 BUS. & COM. LITIG. FED. 
CTS. § 79:47 (4th ed. 2017). 
69 Id. Section 305(b) of Sarbanes-Oxley amended 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5) to add, 
“In any action or proceeding brought or instituted by the Commission under any 
provision of the securities laws, the Commission may seek, and any Federal court 
may grant, any equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit 
of investors.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5) (2012). 
70 ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 39, at 217. The SEC’s authority to 
request and select a receiver can be found in § 20(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 and 
§ 21(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
71 Miller, supra note 68, § 79:48. 
72 Id. 
928 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:915   
Management.73  The order first finds the appointment “necessary 
and appropriate for the purposes of marshaling and preserving 
all assets” of the entity, with enumerated goals that include “an 
orderly wind down,” “a responsible liquidation of assets[,] and 
orderly and fair distribution of those assets to investors.”74  In 
addition, the appointed receiver is granted “all powers, 
authorities, rights and privileges” to assume management and 
control of the receivership entities’ claims and property.75  This 
general language illustrates a district court’s broad grant of 
power and authority to SEC receivers76 and provides insight into 
why the SEC would prefer a receivership to bankruptcy—a 
preference further analyzed in Part IV. 
IV. INEQUITABLE RECEIVERSHIPS 
When the question arises whether bankruptcy or liquidation 
through an equity receivership is appropriate,77 the SEC knows 
the receivership advantage—“no absolute priority rule.”78  As a 
result, receiverships have evolved to become the preferred vehicle 
for the SEC to compensate securities fraud victims of insolvent 
 
73 Order Appointing Receiver at 1–2, SEC v. Platinum Mgmt. (NY) LLC et al., 
No. 16-cv-06848-KAM (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2016), ECF No. 6 [hereinafter Platinum 
Receiver Order]. 
74 Id. at 1–2. Additional enumerated responsibilities of the receiver include: 
to (i) preserve the status quo, (ii) ascertain the extent of commingling of 
funds among the Receivership Entities; (iii) ascertain the true financial 
condition of the Receivership Entities and the disposition of investor funds; 
(iv) prevent further dissipation of the property and assets of the 
Receivership Entities; (v) prevent the encumbrance or disposal of property 
or assets of the Receivership Entities; (vi) preserve the books, records and 
documents of the Receivership Entities; (vii) be available to respond to 
investor inquiries; [and] (viii) protect investors’ assets[.] 
Id. at 2. 
75 Id. at 2–3. 
76 The remaining, pertinent section headings illustrate the SEC receiver’s 
powers: “II. Access to Information . . . III. Access to Books, Records and 
Accounts . . . IV. Access to Real and Personal Property . . . V. Notice to Third 
Parties . . . VI. Injunction Against Interference with Receiver . . . VII. Stay of 
Litigation . . . VIII. Managing Assets . . . IX. Investigate and Prosecute Claims . . . X. 
Bankruptcy Filing . . . XI. Liability of Receiver . . . XII. Recommendations and 
Reports . . . XIII. Fees, Expenses and Accountings.” Id. at 5–17. 
77 Alistaire Bambach, Issues That the SEC Confronts in the Liquidation of 
Hedge Funds, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 125, 127 (2014) [hereinafter Hedge 
Funds]. 
78 Id. The SEC also recognizes that “[t]he benefit of bankruptcy is established 
case law that governs the liquidation of an entity, an experienced judge whose 
primary responsibility is to oversee liquidations and reorganizations, and the 
participation of the United States Trustee and other key constituents.” Id. 
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entities outside of the Code’s strictures: “To the extent that the 
courts permit [the SEC] to use equity receiverships in a way that 
maximizes value to defrauded investors and the estate as a 
whole, [the SEC] will pursue their use.”79 
Thus, the same distribution system that aimed to prevent 
the race to the courthouse among self-interested creditors—
§ 510(b)80—has led to the SEC’s strategic use of receiverships out 
of bankruptcy and the start of a new race to the courthouse: SEC 
v. Creditors.  This Part aims to show how and why the SEC 
utilizes receiverships that disadvantage creditors through the 
Agency’s pervasive influence over the process—from the 
receiver’s initial nomination and appointment to the proposed 
and accepted distribution plans—and concludes with an analysis 
of a recent case to exemplify the high stakes in this race. 
A. SEC Influence Over SEC Receivers 
A receiver is procedurally and nominally an independent 
officer of, and appointed by, the court.81  That said, it is the SEC 
who nominates the receiver and exerts significant influence over 
the receiver in subsequent proceedings.82  In fact, a stated SEC 
advantage of a receiver over a bankruptcy trustee is that 
receivers are mandated to cooperate with law enforcement, 
facilitating greater SEC staff oversight in receivership 
proceedings.83  A recent example from the Platinum 
Management84 receivership illustrates the Commission’s 
influence over a receiver’s decision-making. 
 
 
79 Past and Present, supra note 67, at 612–13. “In some instances, equity 
receiverships are superior to bankruptcy filings because the receiver is a fiduciary to 
the estate . . . [who] can fashion a plan that is supported by the Commission, and 
treats investors and creditors fairly.” Id. at 612. 
80 See supra Part I.B. 
81 See supra Part III.B. 
82 This Note’s research into active receiverships has failed to find an instance 
where the SEC-nominated receiver was not accepted by the court. Further, many 
receivers will be appointed to multiple SEC receiverships. 
83 Hedge Funds, supra note 77, at 127. 
84 On December 19, 2016, the SEC “charged the founder of Platinum Partners 
and the investment managers of two of its flagship hedge funds with conducting a 
fraudulent scheme to inflate asset values and illicitly move investor money to cover 
losses and liquidity problems.” Litigation Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC 
Charges Platinum Funds and Founder with Defrauding Investors (Dec. 20, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2016/lr23704.htm. The receiver was 
appointed the same day the SEC brought its complaint against Platinum. 
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Just six months after appointment, the SEC-nominated 
receiver for Platinum Management resigned due to differing 
views with agency staff on how the receivership should 
progress.85  Notably, after the receiver’s resignation, the SEC 
proposed an amended order appointing a substitute receiver that 
highlighted the Agency’s view of how the independent 
receivership should proceed.86  In the “Managing Assets” section 
of the order, the SEC proposed an entirely new paragraph that 
mandated: “The Receiver may engage in [any liquidation 
transaction that involves Receivership Property whose valuation 
is $1 million or more] only upon submission of such transactions 
for review and comment by the SEC staff and upon motion and 
approval of the Court.”87  This rejected language would have 
allowed the SEC to hijack the receivership proceeding.88  Such 
proposals diminish confidence in the receiver to act as an 
independent officer of the court in the best interests of security 
holders and creditors alike, and instead transform an equitable 
receivership into a functional arm of the SEC.89 
 
85 According to the receiver, SEC staff pressured the receiver, an independent 
officer of the court, to implement a quick liquidation of all positions, rather than the 
receiver’s plan to also invest limited, additional funds to make potential returns for 
investors and creditors. Letter from Celia Goldwag Barenholtz, Counsel, Cooley 
LLP, to Dora L. Irizarry, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court, E. Dist. of N.Y., Exhibit 1 
(June 23, 2017) (on file with the U.S. Dist. Court, E. Dist. of N.Y.)  (requesting 
approval of resignation of Receiver Bart Schwartz in the case of SEC v. Platinum 
Mgmt. (NY) LLC et al., No. 16-cv-06848-BMC (2016)). Lawrence Delevingne, 
Platinum Receiver Asks to Resign over Disagreements with SEC, REUTERS (June 26, 
2017, 12:38 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hedgefunds-platinum/platinum-
receiver-asks-to-resign-over-disagreements-with-sec-idUSKBN19H216. 
86 Blacklined Proposed Second Amended Order Appointing Receiver, SEC v. 
Platinum Mgmt. (NY) LLC et al., No. 16-cv-06848-BMC (June 26, 2017), ECF No. 
174-2 [hereinafter Blacklined Proposed Receiver Order]. 
87 Id. at 12 (emphasis added). 
88 The blacklined, second amended substitution proposal included two more 
problematic suggestions. First, in the “Bankruptcy Filing” section, the authorization 
to file voluntary petitions for relief under Chapter 11 now hinged “upon consultation 
with the SEC staff.” Id. at 15. Next, in the “Recommendations and Reports” section 
that authorizes the Receiver to develop a “Liquidation Plan,” the amended order 
stipulated that authorization hinged “upon consultation with the SEC staff.” Id. at 
16–17. 
89 Non-party shareholders and creditors expressed concern over the amended 
order. See, e.g., Response to Dkt. No. 173 Motion to Appoint Substitute Receiver, 
SEC v. Platinum Mgmt. (NY) LLC et al., No. 16-cv-06848-BMC (E.D.N.Y. June 29, 
2017), ECF No. 186; Indep. Inv’rs’ Response to Sec. & Exch. Comm’n’s Application 
for an Order to Show Cause (Dkt. No. 174), SEC v. Platinum Mgmt. (NY) LLC et al., 
No. 16-cv-06848-BMC (E.D.N.Y. June 30, 2017), ECF No. 201; Statement of Position 
by Non-Parties Beechwood Re Ltd. & Beechwood Bermuda Int’l Ltd. Concerning 
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B. The “Sea Change”: SEC v. Byers and the Anti-Bankruptcy 
Injunction 
In SEC v. Byers, the Second Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s acceptance of SEC language to “Enjoin the Filing of 
Bankruptcy” in a proposed receiver appointment order,90 
effectively foreclosing use of the involuntary bankruptcy 
provision in § 303 of the Bankruptcy Code.91  This anti-
bankruptcy injunction is critical to the SEC receiver’s 
effectiveness; it provides relief from involuntary bankruptcy 
petitions by creditors and acts like an automatic stay in a true 
bankruptcy proceeding.92  This Section shows how the Byers 
holding empowers SEC receivers with broad discretion to conduct 
a quasi-bankruptcy proceeding.93 
The creditors committee of Wextrust—the insolvent entity at 
issue in Byers—challenged the district court’s authority to enter 
the proposed anti-bankruptcy injunction, arguing that § 303 of 
the Code granted creditors an absolute right to commence an 
involuntary bankruptcy proceeding against the debtor.94  But the 
court held that “district courts may issue anti-litigation 
injunctions barring bankruptcy filings as part of their broad 
equitable powers” in an SEC receivership.95  This holding 
entrenches the receivership, forsaking creditors’ reliance on the 
Bankruptcy Code: “Simply put, there is no unwaivable right to 
file an involuntary bankruptcy petition, and, even if there were,  
 
 
SEC’s Application for Appointment of New Receiver, SEC v. Platinum Mgmt. (NY) 
LLC et al., No. 16-cv-06848-BMC (E.D.N.Y. June 30, 2017), ECF No. 205-1. 
90 SEC v. Byers, 609 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2010). 
91 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2012) (“An involuntary case may be commenced only 
under chapter 7 or 11 of this title, and only against a person, except a farmer, family 
farmer, or a corporation that is not a moneyed, business, or commercial corporation, 
that may be a debtor under the chapter under which such case is commenced.”). 
92 Wunderlich, supra note 24, at 386 (“The automatic stay is a fundamental 
aspect of the Code because it provides the debtor a ‘breathing spell’ from creditors 
and collection actions.”). 
93 The underlying facts: “[The SEC] filed a complaint against Stephen Byers, 
Joseph Shereshevsky, [and five Wextrust entities]. The SEC complaint alleged a 
massive Ponzi scheme that involved some 240 Wextrust affiliates operating in the 
United States, Middle East and Africa, and that reportedly defrauded investors of 
approximately $255 million.” Byers, 609 F.3d at 89–90. 
94 Id. at 91. 
95 Id. In addition, the court affirmed the district court’s order permitting the 
Receiver to continue to serve as manager should a bankruptcy proceeding be 
commenced—acknowledging that the receiver automatically becomes debtor in 
possession by operation of law. Id. at 93. 
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the receivership accomplishes what a bankruptcy would.  The 
receivership protects the assets of the estate, just as a stay would 
in bankruptcy.”96 
While the court stressed that these anti-bankruptcy 
provisions should be “exercised cautiously” and “sparsely,” these 
provisions are a staple in SEC receiver requests, providing a 
crucial parallel to an automatic stay in bankruptcy.97  The result 
in Byers arguably promoted a “sea change” in SEC civil 
enforcement strategy, leading to bankruptcy-like liquidations by 
SEC receivers without the Code’s uniformity, structure, or 
creditor protections. 
The full extent of the SEC’s strategy is evidenced in active 
SEC receiver distribution plans.98  For example, in Byers, the 
Wextrust receiver set forth a pro rata distribution of funds to 
each security holder and unsecured creditor, explaining the 
 
96 Id. at 92. The differences in the bankruptcy stay and the anti-bankruptcy 
injunction in receivership illustrate the comparative pros and cons of the two 
systems. The bankruptcy stay allows a company the breathing room to reorganize 
and potentially come out of bankruptcy. If the fraud is so pervasive that the 
company cannot be made out of reorganization, then a Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
proceeding might be the better option. In the anti-bankruptcy injunction—which 
operates as a bankruptcy stay for the receivership proceeding—the receiver does not 
maintain the power to reorganize. Thus, the SEC utilizes the injunction to provide 
the receivership the ability to quickly ascertain the state of the entity, make the 
appropriate liquidations, and distribute the recovered funds to defrauded investors. 
97 Id. at 89, 91. The court emphasized that this was not a broad power to be 
exercised. In a separate part of the opinion, in stating its holding that the court 
disagreed with the creditors’ argument that the district court lacked authority to 
subvert their right to petition for involuntary bankruptcy by issuing the anti-
litigation injunction, the court held: “while it should be sparsely exercised, district 
courts possess the authority and discretion to enter anti-litigation orders, including 
those that bar the filing of involuntary bankruptcy petitions absent the district 
court’s permission.” Id. at 89. Similarly, in considering that a receiver may not be 
equipped, experienced, or prepared for the administration of a complex liquidation, 
the Second Circuit instructed the SEC to inform district courts of the circuit court’s 
view that equity receiverships should not be used to effect the liquidation of 
defendants in actions brought under the securities laws. SEC v. Am. Bd. of Trade, 
Inc., 830 F.2d 431, 436–38 (2d Cir. 1987). 
98 “To the extent that the courts permit [the SEC] to use equity receiverships in 
a way that maximizes value to defrauded investors and the estate as a whole, [the 
SEC] will pursue their use.” Past and Present, supra note 67, at 613. This Note’s 
findings are based on the listed links that were either active or included a receiver’s 
specific website that was active. Receiverships, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/receiverships.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2019). 
This Note does not address, discuss, or explain the different types of methods 
employed by receivers. For a more insightful analysis on the subject, see Kathy 
Bazoian Phelps, Handling Claims in Ponzi Scheme Bankruptcy and Receivership 
Cases, 42 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 567, 572–77 (2012). 
2018] SEC V. CREDITORS  933 
similar treatment in a footnote: “In this regard, defrauded 
investors may be viewed as tort creditors with contingent, 
unliquidated, and potentially disputed claims.”99  The Wextrust 
receiver’s reprioritization of claims to treat defrauded security 
holders on a pro rata basis with unsecured creditors is not 
uncommon—it is widespread practice.100  Indeed, every active 
receivership listed on the SEC’s website treats the claims of 
defrauded security holders on an equal-to101 or preferred basis to 
creditors.102  Thus, the SEC—through its receiver—has perfected 
 
99 Receiver’s Proposed Plan of Distribution at 7, 27 n.29, SEC v. Byers et al., No. 
08 Civ. 7104 (DC) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2009). 
100 See, e.g., Receiver’s Motion (I) to Set Amount of Disputed Claims & (II) 
Establish Procedure to Calculate Claims Distribution at 11, SEC v. Estate of 
Kenneth Wayne Mcleod et al., No. 10-22078-cv-FAM (S.D. Fla. Oct. 4, 2013) 
(distributing claims to defrauded security holders and creditors on a pro rata basis); 
Receiver’s Final Report & Proposed Distribution at 9–10, SEC v. Secure Inv. Servs., 
Inc. et al., No. 2:07-Cv-01724 Geb Cmk (E.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2015) (same); Motion to 
Approve Plan of Distribution at ¶ 17, SEC v. Brian A. Bjork, No. 4:11-Cv-2830 (S.D. 
Tex. 2013) (same); Order Approving Receiver’s Interim Distribution Plan at 6, SEC 
v. Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd. et al., No. 3:09-CV-0298-N (N.D. Tex. May 30, 2013) 
(same); Report of the Receiver Dated November 29, 2012 & Request for Interim 
Distribution at 11, SEC v. Millennium Bank et al., No. 7:09-CV-050-O (N.D. Tex. 
Nov. 11, 2012) (same); Plan for Claims Admin. & Distribution of Proceeds at 10, SEC 
vs. Travis E. Correll et al., No. 4:05-Cv-472 Ras (E.D. Tex. 2008) (same); Receiver’s 
Motion for Authorization to Make an Initial Distribution to Creditors with 
Undisputed Claims & Request to Set a Hearing to Resolve Disputed Claims at 7 n. 
10, SEC v. John P. Utsick, et al., No. 06-20975-CIV-HUCK/O’Sullivan (S.D. Fla. Dec. 
10, 2008) (same); Receiver’s Motion for Approval of Interim Distribution Plan & 
Entry of Claims Bar Date at 12, SEC v. James G. Temme, No. 4:11-Cv-655 (E.D. 
Tex. Dec. 29, 2014) (same). 
101 See, e.g., Receiver’s Motion to Approve Plan of Distribution & Memorandum 
of Law in Support at 18, 2017 WL 4174217 (N.D. Ga. 2017), SEC v. Angelo A. Alleca 
et al. (No. 1:12-CV-3261-WSD), 2017 WL 5953189 (“Allowed Claims of investors and 
of trade creditors are proposed to stand on equal footing, and therefore the Receiver 
proposes no classes of Claims.”); Receiver’s Motion to Establish Claims Procedure 
Plan & to Approve Claim Forms & Brief in Support at 13, SEC v. Edward T. Stein 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2010) (No. 1:09-cv-03125-RJS) (“The treatment of claims by 
creditors on equal footing with defrauded investors was specifically considered and 
approved by the Byers court under similar circumstances . . . . The Receiver believes 
that the limitation of Creditor claims to amounts originally owed, exclusive of 
interest, late fees or penalties, is equitable and appropriately places Creditors on 
equal footing with Investors for recovery from the Estate’s limited assets.”); Plan for 
Claims Admin. & Distribution of Proceeds at 10, SEC vs. Travis E. Correll et al. 
(E.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2008) (No. 4:05-Cv-472 Ras) (“Approved Claims of Investors and 
unsecured Creditors are general unsecured claims against the Receiver Estate and 
shall be paid with equal priority.”). 
102 See, e.g., Amended Joint Plan of Distribution for Atlantic Asset Mgmt., LLC 
Filed by Sec. & Exch. Comm’n & Marti P. Murray, as Receiver at 12–13, SEC v. 
Atlantic Asset Mgmt., LLC, No. 15 Civ. 9764 (WHP) (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (establishing a 
general distribution that included investor claims, and only allowed unsecured 
creditors to participate on a pro rata basis with investors in any supplemental 
934 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:915   
an end run around the Code’s mandatory subordination and 
§ 510(b), answering its own question from forty years earlier—
securities fraud victims should not “receive different treatment 
from that accorded . . . a pedestrian hit by the bankrupt’s 
delivery truck.”103 
If the Byers court had not affirmed the exercise of an anti-
bankruptcy injunction that foreclosed § 303 of the Code, then 
creditors would have the right to force an insolvent entity into 
bankruptcy.  So many, if not most, of these distribution plans 
would be vastly different where, now under the Code, defrauded 
security holders would be automatically subordinated under 
§ 510(b).104  Such is the critical importance of the combined 
receiver and anti-bankruptcy injunction to the SEC.  It creates a  
 
 
 
distribution thereafter); Receiver’s Motion for Court Approval of Proposed Claims 
Process at 6, SEC v. Commodities Online, LLC et al., No. 11-60702-Civ-Cooke/Torres 
(S.D. Fla. Oct. 6. 2015) (basing priority on the available money for distribution, and 
since the available money was insufficient to fully compensate the defrauded 
investors, subordinating all non-investor claims); Receiver’s Motion to Authorize 
First Interim Distribution, Establish Record Dates & Set First Interim Distribution 
Date at 5, 5 nn.3–5, SEC v. Rex Venture Group, LLC et al., No. 3:12-CV-519 
(W.D.N.C. 2014) (“[T]here will be no distribution to . . . Class 2, 4 or 5 Claims,” 
which include “claims . . . secured by collateral,” “[c]laims asserted by taxing 
authorities,” and “[c]laims asserted by general unsecured creditors.”); Receiver’s 
Unopposed Motion to (1) Approve First Interim Distribution, (2) Establish Reserves, 
& (3) Approve Revisions to Certain Claim Determinations at 5–6, SEC v. Arthur 
Nadel et al.; No. 8:09-cv-87-T-26TBM (M.D. Fla. Apr. 27, 2012) (placing investors 
first in line, before secured creditor claims, and unsecured creditor claims third in 
line—only if all allowed amounts for defrauded investor claims had been satisfied in 
full); Receiver’s Motion for Approval of Plan of Distribution of Receivership Estate at 
7, SEC v. Mutual Benefits Corp. et al., No. 04-60573-Civ-Moreno (S.D. Fla. 2009) 
(determining that no trade creditors would receive distributions “[b]ecause there 
[would] be insufficient funds to satisfy the investor claims”); Plaintiff Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n’s Plan for Distribution of Receivership Assets at 4–5, SEC v. Cobalt 
Multifamily Inv’rs I, LLC et al., No. 06 Civ. 2360 (KMW) (MHD) (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(submitting a distribution plan on a pro rata basis giving 50% to investors, 25% to 
unsecured creditors, and 25% to the Receiver and the Receiver’s law firm, with 
future recoveries to be distributed as follows: 33.3% to investors, 33.3% to unsecured 
creditors, and 33.3% to the Receiver Group). 
103 Davis, Jr., supra note 7, at 2 (citing U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON 
S.235 AND S.236, reprinted in The Bankruptcy Reform Act: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on S.235 and S.236 on Improvements in Judicial Mach. of the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 738–79 (1975)); see supra Part I.B. 
This Section discusses the SEC’s argument against § 510(b) because “mandatory 
subordination would result in different treatment to security holders whose fraud 
claims were reduced to judgment before bankruptcy, and those security holders 
whose claim had not reached that point.” H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 196 (1977). 
104 11 U.S.C. § 510(b) (2012). 
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powerful enforcement tool to carry out the Agency’s mission to 
protect defrauded security holders through compensation, 
without regard for the Bankruptcy Code, its priority, or creditors. 
C. The Race Resumed: SEC v. Creditors 
The Wextrust creditors committee argued that the district 
court should not have been “permitted to write Section 303 out of 
the Bankruptcy Code . . . merely because the SEC, which has no 
financial stake in the case, prefers receiverships to 
bankruptcy.”105  That said, the Second Circuit’s decision in Byers 
reinvigorated the collective action problem the Bankruptcy Code 
sought to end—the race to the courthouse.  But, as the same 
creditors recognized in briefing, the race is no longer among self-
interested creditors; it now pits creditors against the SEC.106  The 
high stakes of this renewed race, as evidenced in receiver 
distribution plans, were exemplified in SEC v. Spongetech 
Delivery Systems, Inc., a  case filed in 2010 where the SEC lost 
the courthouse race by mere hours.107 
The SEC charged Spongetech with orchestrating a massive 
pump-and-dump scheme that deceived investors into believing 
they were buying stock in a highly successful company.108  The 
Agency’s civil enforcement action began in a familiar fashion: by 
installing its receiver.109  On June 18, 2010, the Commission 
moved for the appointment of a receiver—equipped with an anti-
bankruptcy injunction110—over Spongetech, its subsidiaries, and 
its affiliates, including its wholly owned subsidiary Dicon 
Technologies, LLC.111  The SEC took what appeared to be an 
early lead. 
 
105 Reply Brief for Interested Party-Appellants Int’l Ad-Hoc Comm. of Wextrust 
Creditors & Int’l Consortium of Wextrust Creditors at 20, SEC v. Byers, 609 F.3d 87 
(2d. Cir. 2010) (Nos. 09-0234-cv(L), 09-0284-cv(CON)). 
106 Id. at 4 (“[T]he SEC takes the position that it may foreclose the statutory 
rights of Wextrust’s creditors to file involuntary bankruptcy cases simply because it 
beat those creditors to the courthouse.”). 
107 SEC v. Spongetech Delivery Systems, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 3d 530 (E.D.N.Y. 
2014). 
108 Id. at 543. 
109 Notice of Plaintiff Sec. & Exch. Comm’n’s Motion for Appointment of a 
Receiver over Defendant Spongetech Delivery Systems, Inc. at 2, SEC v. Spongetech, 
98 F. Supp. 3d 530 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. 10-CV-02031 (DLI)), ECF No. 44. 
110 [Proposed] Order Granting Appointing a Receiver over Defendant 
Spongetech Delivery Systems, Inc. at 9–10, SEC v. Spongetech, 98 F. Supp. 3d 530 
(E.D.N.Y. June 18, 2014) (No. 10-CV-02031 (DLI)), ECF No. 44-3. 
111 Id. at 2. 
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But while the Agency hurried to appoint its receiver in 
Brooklyn, just three hours earlier, in a Bankruptcy Court in 
Savannah, Georgia, three Dicon Technologies creditors sprinted 
to file an involuntary bankruptcy petition under § 303 and move 
for the immediate appointment of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
trustee.112  Those creditors succeeded, and a trustee was 
appointed over Dicon on July 9, 2010.113  Unlike in Byers, the 
Dicon creditors won the race to the courthouse. Accordingly, 
Dicon’s parent, Spongetech, eventually entered its own Chapter 
11 bankruptcy with a trustee appointment.114  The loss forced the 
SEC to withdraw its receiver request115 because, as the Agency 
pointed out, “the bankruptcy trustee would undertake many of 
the same functions as a Receiver.”116 
 
 
112 Letter from Jeffrey T. Tao, Assistant Chief Litig. Counsel, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, to Dora L. Irizarry, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court, E. Dist. of N.Y. (June 21, 
2010)  (on file with the U.S. Dist. Court, E. Dist. of N.Y.) (informing court of Dicon 
creditors’ involuntary bankruptcy petition and motion for appointment of a 
bankruptcy trustee in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District 
of Georgia) [hereinafter Tao Letter]. The Bankruptcy Code allows the Court to 
appoint a Chapter 11 trustee “for cause, including fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, 
or gross mismanagement of the affairs of the debtor by current management, either 
before or after the commencement of the case,” or “if such appointment is in the 
interests of creditors, any equity security holders, and other interests of the estate.” 
11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1), (2) (2012). 
113 Tao Letter, supra note 112. 
114 Following the Dicon petition, Spongetech filed for bankruptcy in the 
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. In addition, the United 
States Trustee appeared, and filed an expedited motion supporting the immediate 
appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee over Spongetech. Motion of the U.S. Trustee for 
Order Directing the Appointment of a Chapter 11 Trustee or, in the Alternative, 
Converting the Case to Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, SEC v. Spongetech, 98 F. 
Supp. 3d 530 (E.D.N.Y. July 16, 2010) (No. 10-CV-2031 (DLI)) ECF No. 91-4. Even 
so, the SEC continued to argue for a receivership instead of bankruptcy. Plaintiff 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n’s Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Appointment of 
a Receiver, SEC v. Spongetech, 98 F. Supp. 3d 530 (E.D.N.Y. July 16, 2010) (No. 10-
CV-02031 (DLI)), ECF No. 91. But the Bankruptcy Court accepted the United States 
Trustee’s request and directed the appointment of a bankruptcy trustee over 
Spongetech. Letter from Jeffrey T. Tao, Assistant Chief Litig. Counsel, U.S. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n, to Dora L. Irizarry, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court, E. Dist. of N.Y. 
(July 20, 2010) (on file with the U.S. Dist. Court, E. Dist. of N.Y.). 
115 Letter from Jeffrey T. Tao, Assistant Chief Litig. Counsel, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, to Dora L. Irizarry, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court, E. Dist. of N.Y. (July 20, 
2010) (on file with the U.S. Dist. Court, E. Dist. of N.Y.). 
116 Plaintiff Sec. & Exch. Comm’n’s Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Appointment of a Receiver at 2, SEC v. Spongetech, 98 F. Supp. 3d 530 (E.D.N.Y. 
2014) (No. 10-CV-02031 (DLI)), ECF No. 91. 
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Spongetech’s Chapter 11 trustee’s interim report illustrates 
the immediate effect of winning this race: “Pursuant to the 
priority rules established by the Bankruptcy Code, unsecured 
creditors must be paid in full before any funds or returns can be 
received by shareholders.”117  The critical nature of who wins this 
race to the courthouse between the SEC and creditors rests in 
that one sentence.  Had the SEC won and a receiver been 
installed, security holders would have been on equal-to or better 
footing with creditors.118  By winning the race to the courthouse, 
creditors beat the Byers anti-bankruptcy injunction, forced the 
entity into bankruptcy, and pushed themselves ahead of security 
holders under § 510(b). 
The importance of just a few hours in this race is further 
embodied in the Spongetech court’s decision to maintain the 
Code’s priority for a secured creditor’s claim over an SEC 
disgorgement claim.119  The Spongetech bankruptcy resulted in 
the disbursement of the entire $1.046 million estate to Solution 
Funding, a secured creditor, because creditors won the race to 
the courthouse.120  Had those creditors acted a few hours later 
and the SEC—holding a $5.19 million disgorgement claim—
installed its receiver, it is unlikely, as the SEC argued, that any 
creditor—secured or not—would have seen any compensation.121 
V. REINTEGRATION OF SECURITIES FRAUD CLAIMS  
IN BANKRUPTCY 
Interestingly, many parallels exist between Slain and 
Kripke’s seminal article that led to mandatory subordination and 
the integration issues facing securities fraud enforcement and 
bankruptcy today.  Regarding the SEC’s use of receiverships to 
avoid bankruptcy and promote its own mission above others, 
Slain and Kripke’s conclusion proves salient: “The policies of 
state and federal securities regulation are important; they are 
not transcendental.”122  Still, the Bankruptcy Code’s treatment of 
 
117 Trustee’s First Interim Report at 11, In re Spongetech Delivery Systems, 
Inc., No. 10-13647 (SMB) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2010), ECF No. 69. 
11 U.S.C. §§ 510(b), 1129(a). 
118 See supra notes 98–102 and accompanying text. 
119  SEC v. Spongetech Delivery Systems, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 3d 530, 540 (E.D.N.Y. 
2014). 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 535. 
122 Slain & Kripke, supra note 12, at 299 (“In case of corporate bankruptcy, the 
public interest favoring private remedies for the violation of these laws must be 
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defrauded security holders under § 510(b) gives the SEC little 
choice in acting to avoid the Code’s priority.  So, just as Slain and 
Kripke wrote in 1973: “The time has come for a 
reconsideration . . . .”123 
This Part seeks to provide the start to a solution that 
realigns SEC civil enforcement strategy with the Bankruptcy 
Code while furthering the interests of security holders and 
creditors.  Furthermore, it aims to end the collective action 
problem that has evolved between the SEC and creditors in and 
out of bankruptcy.  Ironically, in order to better protect creditors, 
the first step is to revisit the Code’s provision that was intended 
to protect them: § 510(b).124 
A. Revisiting § 510(b) 
The Code’s treatment of defrauded security holders under 
§ 510(b) gives the SEC few alternatives to avoid or ameliorate the 
Code’s broad subordination of defrauded security holder claims.  
Thus, Congress must revisit § 510(b).  In doing so, Congress 
should consider three objectives: (1) permit securities fraud 
victims fair representation in bankruptcy cases; (2) incentivize 
creditors to act as more effective fraud monitors; and (3) remove 
the SEC’s primary motivation to use receiverships, which conflict 
with the Code’s priority scheme.125 
First, providing defrauded securities holders a voice in 
bankruptcy and improving their prospects for recovery would 
significantly impact a number of cases where victims of a debtor’s 
fraud have no economic incentive to participate in the 
bankruptcy process.126  Any change should aim to allow private 
enforcement to help deter wrongdoing and provide “an 
indispensable tool with which defrauded investors can recover 
their losses without having to rely upon government action.”127  
Permitting defrauded security holders to act as private attorneys 
general would free up valuable SEC resources, supplement the 
 
balanced against other interests worthy of protection—notably the reliance interests 
of . . . lenders and trade creditors.”). 
123 Id. at 285. 
124 See COLLIER, supra note 5, ¶ 510.04[1]. 
125 See Hedge Funds, supra note 77, at 127. 
126 See James J. Park, Securities Class Actions and Bankrupt Companies, 111 
MICH. L. REV. 547, 582–83 (2013) (finding that a significant percentage of securities 
class actions involve failed companies and that there are many cases in which a 
company has not formally filed for bankruptcy but is in financial distress). 
127 H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.). 
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Commission’s enforcement objectives, and allow the SEC to bring 
more selective actions against individuals, effectively achieving 
greater overall deterrence.128 
Next, also in the spirit of deterrence, improving defrauded 
security holders’ ability to recover in bankruptcy should 
incentivize creditors to better monitor entities to which they 
decide to extend credit.  This would be the case, in particular, if 
defrauded investors were entitled to some recovery from the 
proceeds of the debtor’s unlawful activity, even in situations 
where a secured creditor is asserting a lien on that property.  The 
increased attentiveness of creditors, effectively acting as fraud 
monitors, may promote the early detection of serious securities 
law violations. 
Finally, and above all, Congress must revisit § 510(b) to 
reduce the SEC’s incentive to use receiverships and avoid the 
Code’s priority.  Such action puts the SEC at odds with creditors, 
leads to conflicts within the federal system, and results in 
insolvency proceedings lacking the certainty and structure of 
bankruptcy proceedings.129  With defrauded security holders 
empowered to assert their rights, the SEC no longer has a direct 
need to use receiverships—especially when a bankruptcy 
proceeding would be more appropriate. 
B. In Bankruptcy: Empowering the United States Trustee 
In a second step to integrate securities fraud enforcement in 
bankruptcy, the United States Trustee should be empowered to 
carry out its statutorily prescribed duties to better coordinate its 
efforts with the SEC.  The U.S. Trustee is responsible for 
overseeing the administration of bankruptcy cases and private 
trustees; its mission is to promote the integrity and efficiency of 
the bankruptcy system for debtors, creditors, and the public.130 
But with respect to SEC regulation of insolvent firms 
accused of defrauding investors, the U.S. Trustee’s authority is 
not sufficient to fulfill its intended and self-described purpose to 
 
128 See Park, supra note 126, at 585. Focusing securities fraud liability on these 
individuals could better deter securities fraud, and so bankruptcy cases are a setting 
where individuals, rather than the company, should be the focus of liability. 
Wunderlich, supra note 24, at 376. 
129 See Hedge Funds, supra note 77, at 127 (recognizing bankruptcy benefits 
such as established case law, experienced judges, and the participation of the United 
States Trustee). 
130 28 U.S.C. § 586 (2012); U.S. Trustee Program, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
https://www.justice.gov/ust/about-program. 
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act as the “watchdog over the bankruptcy process.”131  The U.S. 
Trustee lacks the proper influence to work in coordination with—
or to challenge—the SEC when necessary to protect the Code.  
For example, the U.S. Trustee was absent in the Byers litigation 
that stripped creditors of the Code’s grant of power in § 303. 
To better integrate the SEC’s mission with the Bankruptcy 
Code, the U.S. Trustee needs the ability to act as a counterweight 
to SEC influence.  Furthermore, for the SEC’s part, the Agency 
must have faith in an equitable distribution in bankruptcy.  
Accordingly, the U.S. Trustee should be reequipped with the tools 
needed to realize its mission as Congress intended: to “serve as 
bankruptcy watch-dogs to prevent fraud, dishonesty, and 
overreaching in the bankruptcy arena”132 and to operate like the 
SEC under the Bankruptcy Act, “protecting the public interest 
and ensuring that bankruptcy cases are conducted according to 
the law.”133 
C. Out of Bankruptcy: Receivership Oversight and Fairness 
It is possible that even a wholesale repeal of § 510(b) would 
not provide a persuasive incentive for the SEC to prefer a 
bankruptcy over a receivership in which it exerts significant 
influence to directly benefit the security holders the Agency seeks 
to protect.  But, like Slain and Kripke wrote, federal securities 
law policy is not transcendental to all other interests—here, the 
interests of creditors.134  Win or lose, this continued race to the 
courthouse will only end in diminished SEC enforcement 
resources.  
The creation of an SEC position focused on promoting 
fairness in receiverships and equipped with oversight capabilities 
to establish certainty within the process could result in a more 
effective, efficient distribution process that benefits defrauded 
 
131 U.S. Trustee Program, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/ust/ 
about-program. “[T]he U.S. Trustee’s powers are strictly circumscribed, and the 
program has been embattled from its inception.” Rise and Fall, supra note 26, at 45. 
132 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 88 (1977). See Rise and Fall, supra note 26, at 45 
(citing Peter C. Alexander, A Proposal to Abolish the Office of United States Trustee, 
30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1 (1996) as a critical assessment of the U.S. Trustee’s 
performance). 
133 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 109 (1977). See Rise and Fall, supra note 26, at 45 
(“In large bankruptcies, the U.S. Trustee’s principal role often is to quibble about 
requests for attorney’s fees—a far cry from the majestic role that William Douglas 
had carved out for the SEC in the Chandler Act of 1938.”). 
134 Slain & Kripke, supra note 12, at 299. 
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security holders and creditors alike.  In addition, a position like 
this could ensure satisfaction of the Second Circuit’s past 
instructions admonishing the receivership replacement of the 
bankruptcy process.135 
This position could also act to coordinate with the U.S. 
Trustee to integrate the Agency’s goals back into bankruptcy.  
With a bridge between SEC receiverships and the bankruptcy 
process, the Commission and the U.S. Trustee could objectively 
analyze and decide whether a receivership or a bankruptcy 
proceeding would be the best option for the insolvent entity and 
defrauded claimants—both creditors and security holders—under 
any set of circumstances.  The upshot would be employing the 
best parts of the receivership and the Code.  Such a system would 
inject a confidence in SEC receivers for creditors, and likewise 
provide a similar sense of security for defrauded security holders 
in bankruptcy. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note is intended to educate stakeholders about how 
equitable receiverships are being utilized.  Furthermore, it hopes 
to advance the conversation on integrating securities fraud 
enforcement with bankruptcy law.  To meaningfully continue 
such a conversation, any solution to harmonize the SEC’s civil 
enforcement strategy with the Bankruptcy Code must start with 
§ 510(b).  Effectively reprioritizing securities fraud claims to 
provide a remuneration path for security holders in bankruptcy 
will eliminate the SEC’s incentive to use mechanisms like the 
equitable receivership and take the first step in bringing those 
claims back into bankruptcy proceedings.  Without that 
incentive, the increased, coordinative efforts between a newly-
empowered U.S. Trustee and the SEC can provide the framework 
for a more efficient system to equitably compensate all defrauded 
claimants in and out of bankruptcy.  In sum, the race between 
the SEC and creditors will end. 
 
135 See SEC v. Byers, 609 F.3d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 2010). See also Eberhard v. Marcu, 
530 F.3d 122, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that “receivership should not be used as an 
alternative to bankruptcy”); SEC v. Am. Bd. of Trade, Inc., 830 F.2d 431, 436–38 (2d 
Cir. 1987) (instructing the SEC to inform district courts of the Second Circuit’s 
reservations that equity receiverships should not be used to effect the liquidation of 
defendants in actions brought under the securities laws). 
